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ABSTRACT: What does it mean to think? In the following article I will show Gilles Deleuze’s 
answer to this question. According to him ’to think is to create—there is no other creation—but to 
create is first of all to engender 'thinking' in thought’ (Deleuze 1994: 147). To understand what this 
means, to grasp the radical nature of such an event, we need to see how for Deleuze to 
engender thinking in thought means a repetition of that genetic process which has brought 
forth the thinking subject in the first place. In this event that which otherwise subsists beneath 
normal experience, as life- and consciousness sustaining forces, now become conscious 
experience. The implication of this is that true thinking means the creation of a new life and 
consciousness. Via a close-reading of chapter two of Difference and Repetition I show how this leads 
the thinker into a radical metamorphosis of consciousness, a process of Stirb und Werde (die and 
become). 
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What does it mean to think? In the following article I will show Gilles Deleuze’s 
answer to this question. According to him ’to think is to create—there is no other 
creation—but to create is first of all to engender 'thinking' in thought’ (Deleuze 1994: 
147). To understand what this means, to grasp the radical nature of such an event, we 
need to see how for Deleuze to engender thinking in thought means a repetition of 
that genetic process which has brought forth the thinking subject in the first place. In 
this event that which otherwise subsists beneath normal experience, as life- and 
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consciousness sustaining forces, now become conscious experience. True thinking 
therefore means the creation of a new life and consciousness. In order to show how 
this metamorphosis takes place I present a close-reading of the doctrine of the sub-
representative syntheses, presented in the second chapter of Difference and Repetition. 
Here Deleuze presents a transcendental genesis, a genesis of thinking and 
consciousness out of a vital matter. In my reading I show how the engendering of 
thinking within thought involves a repetition of this genetic process of consciousness in 
consciousness – something which can only take place via a radical metamorphosis, a 
death and rebirth of the thinking consciousness. Here Deleuzian philosophy therefore 
enters into the domain of the esoteric, where vital processes of the universe enters into 
and transforms human consciousness into a cosmic becoming.  
In secondary literature on Deleuze there has been a great deal of work done on 
clarifying this fundamental doctrine of the passive syntheses.1 Also the metaphysical 
and esoteric or hermetic nature of his thought has been much discussed.2 But there is 
still no close-reading which attempts to show how his theory of genesis relates to a 
possible experience of this sub-representational genetic domain, and what that would 
mean as the creation of thinking within thought.3 The following essay attempts to do 
1 Thorough discussions of the passive syntheses has been presented in Jay Lampert´s Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Philosophy of History, Keith Faulkner’s Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time as well as in Levi Bryant’s 
Difference and Givenness. 
2Christian Kerslake’s Deleuze and the Unconscious is a valuable source for situating Deleuze’s oeuvre within 
the field of esoteric and occult influence on philosophy and psychoanalysis, thus substantiating the claim 
that Deleuze in his philosophy is occupied with the question of how the thinker can undergo a 
transmutation. Joshua Ramey’s The Hermetic Deleuze is another work which takes Deleuze in this direction. 
Ramey reads Deleuze’s philosophy as the expression of a spiritual ordeal or initiation, and sees it as part 
of a philosophical tradition which goes all the way back to the Renaissance. Yet another reading which 
(over)stresses the esoteric nature of Deleuze’s thought is Peter Hallward’s Out of this World. Hallward 
argues that Deleuze’s philosophy is to be understood as a mystical enterprise. However, as many 
reviewers have pointed out, this reading becomes almost a caricature because of its one-sidedness and 
many half-truths. See for example Henry Somers-Hall’s review ’The Politics of Creation’ in Pli 18, 2007. 
3 A number of authors raise this question of experience and of the transformation of the thinker, but more 
often than not the problematic is mentioned more or less in passing, and not developed along textual close 
reading. For example says Alberto Toscano in his The Theatre of Production ‘Deleuze’s doctrine is profoundly 
concerned not just with the determination of the conditions of realization of individuality, but with the 
experience of the preindividual itself (transcendental empiricism) ... the agonistic transformation of the 
thinker in the encounter with the domain of the preindividual … [This is] a speculative praxis that relates 
to internal difference by interiorizing it, by making ‘itself’ into nothing but the interior (the fold) of 
intensive processes of differentiation.‘ (Toscano 2006: 199f) This statement makes clear the centrality of 
this question, but Toscano do not more than point at the problem of an experience of the pre-individual. 
Other studies with focus on this question include Conditions of Thought by Daniela Voss and Immanence and 
the Vertigo of Philosophy Christian Kerslake. Voss ’understand the “caesura” or “cut”, that constitutes the 
third synthesis of time, as the moment when the virtual event breaks into the chronological and empirical 
order of time.’ She therefore also ‘certainly do bestow an existentialist dimension to the third synthesis of 
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that. First I present the dogmatic image of thought and its basic model as the structure 
of recognition. This form of thinking, the representational consciousness, is the result 
of an unconscious genetic process which Deleuze presents in the second chapter.4 I 
therefore continue to do a close-reading of the second chapter of Difference and 
Repetition. This has its culmination when we come to the third synthesis which is where 
the genesis that is otherwise unconscious becomes ’experience’. This happens in the 
encounter with a ’sign’ which forces us to think, an idea presented in the third chapter 
of Difference and Repetition, and it is this event which both break out of that form of 
consciousness and thinking which he variously name as representation, recognition, 
common sense or the dogmatic image of thought, and which propels us into the 
genesis depicted with the doctrine of the passive syntheses. I try to show how this 
metamorphosis is portrayed in relation to the passive syntheses by quoting a number 
of other books where that same process is depicted. The conclusion of this essay is that 
for Deleuze in the creation of thinking within thought in the third synthesis of time, a 
process of Stirb und Werde (die and become) takes place.   
time … since Deleuze insists on its disruptive impact on the identity of the subject and its liberating power 
with regard to all prior possibilities of life.‘ (Voss 2013: 250f) In Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy 
Christian Kerslake concludes that the completion of the Copernican revolution in philosophy begun by 
Kant for Deleuze necessitates an experiential drama where ’consciousness and “becoming conscious” is 
related to the unconscious as the passageway to greater, more encompassing integrations’ (Kerslake 2009: 
266). Both Voss and Kerslake give weighty arguments for approaching Deleuze as a philosopher in which 
not only new thoughts but a creative metamorphosis of thinking and experience belongs to it. However, 
they do so without much explicit discussion of how the metamorphosis of experience is depicted as 
belonging to the conceptual trajectory of the text. 
4 Joe Hughes has argued that ‘The only way to understand Deleuze’s texts is to understand them as a 
theorization of genesis’ (Hughes 2008: 16). In this book he argues that there is a structural scheme 
underlying all of Deleuze´s works. In this narrative we move from an unindividuated matter through 
passive syntheses to the creation of empirical self-consciousness with its good and common sense. 
According to Hughes Deleuze thinks this genesis in almost all of his works but with different terminology; 
from desiring production in the molecular strata to the social production of molar individuated subjects 
and objects. From microperceptions in the depth of bodies to macroperceptions of the empirical world. 
From partial objects through surfaces to individuated subjects and objects. In this narrative Deleuze 
moves from what appears as a given in his system, which for Hughes is an inconsistent evanescent 
materiality, and from there depicts the genetic constitution of individuals, of representation. The structure 
of the genesis is given in the three sub-representative passive syntheses which Deleuze presents in the 
second chapter of Difference and Repetition, but which Hughes argues can be found throughout all of 
Deleuze’s work. Whereas Deleuze´s texts certainly should be understood ‘as a theorization of genesis’, my 
contention is that it is necessary to understand this theorization as a starting point for a praxis which 
engenders a real genesis. 
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THE DOGMATIC IMAGE OF THOUGHT 
In the beginning of the third chapter of Difference and Repetition Deleuze submits the 
image we have of thought to a harsh and destructive critique ’to see whether this 
image does not betray the very essence of thought as pure thought’ (Deleuze 1994: 
133). What does this critique consist of? Deleuze identifies and criticizes eight 
postulates that belong to it, but these can be brought back to a basic structure or 
‘model’ that underlies this image and predetermines what it means to think: 
There is indeed a model, in effect: that of recognition. Recognition may be 
defined as the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same 
object: the same object may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined or 
conceived. (Deleuze 1994: 133) 
The act of recognition as the harmonious exercise of the faculties is defined as 
common sense, and depends upon every faculty to ‘relate their given and relate 
themselves to a form of identity in the object’ (133). Thus when we recognize 
something, each faculty is informed and determined by the others in such a way as to 
produce one and the same object. Different kinds of sense impressions, memories and 
previous conceptions are all activated and produce together one identical object. 
Even if recognition is given as a general principle of the image of thought, Kant’s 
analysis of the cognitive synthesis expresses its essential structure and is the model 
which Deleuze uses. It consists of three different interwoven operations.5 The first 
aspect is a successive synthesis as apprehension of parts in space and time. Pure sensible 
intuition is for Kant a pure manifold of space and time, and apprehension consists in a 
selective synthesis of a spatio-temporal manifold. But in order for such a synthesis to be 
successful, the preceding parts need to be conserved and contracted into the following 
ones, for otherwise the whole synthesis would dissolve. Therefore the reproduction of 
parts is the next aspect of the synthesis. This operation belongs, for Kant, not to 
intuition itself but to the faculty of imagination. The imagination thus has the capacity 
to preserve and contract. But for this to become perceptual experience we still need 
the determination in a concept. However, a conceptual determination for Kant 
requires that we first have the idea of an object. In order to qualify a selected and 
synthesized sensible manifold as this or that, the pure concept of an object = x is 
required as an a priori condition for conceptual determination to take place. Thus at 
this point what has been apprehended and reproduced in the imagination from the 
pure sensible manifold of intuition, finds the pure form of an object in the 
understanding, and through this, recognition can be effectuated when a concept 
5Kant discusses this in the first version of the transcendental deduction of the categories in Critique of Pure 
Reason. The following presentation also draws on Deleuze’s Lectures on Kant from 28.03.1978. 
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identifies the object. Therefore what is given in the sensible, what is held fast in 
imagination and what is determined by understanding converge as the recognition of 
an object. 
At a deeper level, this economy of the faculties and their identity in the object of 
recognition is grounded in the unity of the thinking subject, i.e. in the cogito as ‘the 
unity of all the faculties’ (133). It is the cogito that serves as the principle of identity and 
the object x is the correlate to the transcendental subjectivity that functions as an a priori 
condition for possible experience. The cogito therefore occupies a central role and 
function in the image of thought, by grounding and conserving a predetermined and 
abstract form of identity. Without ‘I think’ there is no self-consciousness and no 
thinking, but with this self-identity, also the idea of object is borne, since subject and 
object presuppose and imply each other. Thus rules from the understanding determine 
the configuration of the intuitively given manifold to be recognized. 
A problem that haunts this account, and which Deleuze will take up, is how the 
manifold of intuitions can lend themselves to conceptual determination if they are 
themselves without any inherent organizing activity. Intuition for Kant is a purely 
passive faculty, differing in kind from the intelligible. Therefore he consigns to the 
faculty of imagination the secret operation of configuring the sensible manifold for 
cognitive apprehension. This imaginative pre-structuring is however determined by 
the categories of the understanding ‘directing’ the imaginative faculty. Thus between 
imagination as actively informing and intuition passively receiving there is an abyss, 
since all rule based activity comes from one side. 
Further Deleuze claims that in Kant’s analysis of recognition the manner in which 
the faculties relate and constitute the content of experience is not grasped because his 
analysis in fact presupposes what it is supposed to explain. Only by abstracting the 
remembered, the conceived and the perceived after having recognized an object does 
he come to analyse and determine the transcendental conditions. Thus the faculties 
are in fact determined by what they are supposed to constitute. In this way the 
transcendental conditions are traced from the empirical, instead of being able to 
account for its genesis. In Kant’s critical philosophy there is a reversal of the 
relationship between the transcendental and the empirical, the conditioning and the 
given. 
But as Deleuze says, we need to fulfill Kant’s project by creating a transcendental 
genesis, and not only a transcendental conditioning. To do this we must go deeper 
than the analysis which traces the transcendental conditions for cognitive operations, 
and find the genetic processes which constitute the basis for these active operations of 
the mind. In this operation the two poles which are mutually involved in the 
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constitution of representation – recognition based on all faculties converging on an 
identical object, and the cogito as the subjective ground of this unity – must be 
dissolved. This destruction of the dogmatic image means a de-actualization of the 
structure of recognition and the cogito. These two claws of the lobster-god make us 
prisoners to a thinking in judgements which gets the world backwards: difference and 
metamorphosis is subjected to identity and stasis. When this de-actualisation takes 
place the faculties are liberated from their enslavement to pre-given form of identity, 
and this liberation means that the faculties go through a transmutation and become 
transcendent organs that ’grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and 
brings it into the world’ (Deleuze 1994: 143). In other words, the faculties understood as 
capacities belonging to a subject confronting an objective world dissolve and ’grasp’ or 
’experience’ their own genesis on a plane of immanence. And this genesis is the passive 
syntheses presented in the second chapter of Difference and Repetition. 
THE FIRST SYNTHESIS OF TIME 
The first step in giving a genetic account of thought is to show how prior to any 
cognitively active apprehension initiated by an intentional mind, there occurs ‘passive 
syntheses of contemplation or contraction’ that takes place in the mind (Deleuze 1994: 
98). The argument that attempts to show this is convoluted, drawing upon both 
empirical transcendental and speculative moments, and therefore only the general 
thrust of the argument can be discussed here. 
When synthetic activity is displaced from the active mind to something happening 
in the mind, it means that the manifold of intuition is not taken up a priori by an active 
ordering principle. The strict distinction between spontaneity and receptivity that 
Kant had introduced between intuition and the other faculties made him have to 
assume ‘sensations already formed, then merely relating these to the a priori forms of 
their representation which are determined as space and time’ (98). With Deleuze’s 
operation, the faculty of imagination as what organizes sensible intuition in cognitive 
synthesis is grounded in a passive synthesis of sensibility that lies beneath 
representational consciousness. This means connecting the perceptive synthesis with 
the forces composing our senses and bodies, because, as Deleuze says, these passive 
syntheses ‘concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have’, but extend all the 
way to that primary sensibility that we are; ‘The sensed quality is indistinguishable 
from the contraction of elementary excitations…[but these] perceptual syntheses refer 
back to organic syntheses which are like the sensibility of the senses’ (72f). Underneath 
our representation of the world and the active syntheses which co-constitute and relate 
to these representations a sub-representative passive self is at work. And this passive 
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self ‘is not defined simply by receptivity – that is, by means of the capacity to 
experience sensations – but by virtue of the contractile contemplation which 
constitutes the organism itself before it constitutes the sensations’ (78). 
Perception is here not understood within the framework of objects affecting 
subject, but as what is formed when out of a multiplicity of minute perceptions a 
differential relation determines some to stand out as conscious experience. We rise out 
of an ocean of micro-perceptions; out of the differential of the unconscious the world 
of subject and object is crystalized. 
These contractile contemplations which constitute the organism and its sensations 
are also what Deleuze calls the living now. They belong to the temporal dimension of 
the actual world; the actual is, temporally speaking, always a present. From this point 
of view one could say that past and future as such are only abstractions. The future 
and the past are in itself unreal since they do not exist as past and as future. ‘The past 
and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but 
rather the dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants’ (71). 
Past and future are therefore dimensions inherent to the present, relative to the 
contractile range of the actual present. Only the present exists, but there are lesser and 
greater presents. For each present there is always a greater present in which the 
smaller is an instant. At the limit, everything that exists is a local finite contraction 
within a network of different levels, implicated in one all-engulfing present actuality, 
contracting past and future into an eternally changing present. ‘The greatest present, 
the divine present, is the great mixture, the unity of corporeal causes among 
themselves’ (Deleuze 2004: 186). 
In this perspective time is displaced from its Kantian status as an a priori form of 
intuition and materialized. ‘Inside Chronos, the present is in some manner corporeal’ 
(Deleuze 2004: 162). Time is the life and processes of material beings and events, it is 
internalized as the morphogenesis of entities and their network of relations. Evolution 
does not take place in time, evolution is time. And insofar as inorganic matter is 
temporal, this holds not only for organisms and plants, but for everything. The process 
is more fundamental than the product which expresses it. 
In this way Deleuze grounds sensible apprehension in a synthesis of time that does 
not belong to the conscious perceiving mind but to matter as sub-representational 
sensibility. The formation of cognitive content in recognition depends on previous 
passive syntheses that constitute the quality and extensity of the world. Both the 
perceiving mind and the organism in relation to which perception takes place are 
constituted from the contractile contemplations. There is therefore a material 
continuum between pre-individual processes of a transcendental sensibility and 
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individualized and subjectively appropriated perceptions, but a threshold separates the 
two. 
A consequence of this, which is the important point in this context, is that 
experience is capable in principle of reaching all the way into the pre-subjective 
processes of sensation, into the intensity that constitute empirical perceptions. There is 
a differential threshold which defines where minute perceptions contract and 
constitute definite qualities. Another name for this threshold is the Other-structure. In 
Michele Tournier and the World Without Others Deleuze writes that it is the Other-structure 
which prevents perception from coinciding with things because of a time-difference in 
the constitution of objects and subject. ‘The Other thus assures the distinction between 
consciousness and its object as a temporal distinction. …  In the Other’s absence, 
consciousness and its object are one. … Consciousness ceases to be a light cast upon 
objects in order to become a pure phosphorescence of things in themselves’ (Deleuze 
2004: 350). To perceive beyond this threshold is no longer to inform and objectify the 
world, but to participate in the contractions which constitute us in the first place. And, 
as we will see further below, it is precisely such a breakthrough which takes place in 
the break with recognition and common sense. 
THE SECOND SYNTHESIS OF TIME 
The first synthesis constitutes the living present; any living present (of a rock, plant, 
animal or human) is a contraction of a number of smaller presents, and past and future 
are here dimensions of the present, its contractile range being its temporal extension. 
Once a present is gone, it is no more, and has no past or future. Only to the extent 
that it belongs as an instant of a greater present does it continue to exist. From this 
perspective nothing but the present exists, and therefore time would seem to be co-
exstensive with the present. But this first account is not enough to explain time 
according to Deleuze. Time is not co-exstensive with the time of the present. If that 
were the case, the past would only be a trace of former presents in the actual present. 
But according to Deleuze, and following Bergson, the past is real in itself. The past is 
not preserved in the present, as something belonging to the actual, but in itself, as past. 
In order to show us this pure past Deleuze refers us to a paradox belonging to the 
present as present: 
What is actual is always a present. But then, precisely, the present changes or 
passes. We can always say that it becomes past when it no longer is, when a new 
present replaces it. But this is meaningless. It is clearly necessary for it to pass for 
the new present to arrive, and it is clearly necessary for it to pass at the same time 
as it is present, at the moment that it is the present. (Deleuze 1997: 78) 
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Because the present passes it must be both present and past at the same time. 
Deleuze argues that we must conceive another transcendental time in which the first 
synthesis is grounded, and which causes the present to pass. This is a puzzling 
statement. 
We can get a sense of this point if we reflect on our experience of time. Here we 
can see that we need minimal memory of the past to ground the passing of time, to see 
the difference. It is the memory of the past that makes a difference between pure 
presence without consciousness of passing time, and the passing of time that is 
experienced in the present. However, this memory cannot be based on the empirical 
faculty of memory or reproduction since that already presupposes a constituted 
present to retain. The empirical memory comes too late to fulfill the function of 
establishing the difference between past and present within the present. The present, 
in order to be passing, has to be, as present, different from itself. And this difference lies 
in the fact that the present is past at the same time as it is present. Time is change. In 
relation to what? In relation to itself as past. But this past cannot have anything to do 
with the actual, because the actual is always present. Only within time itself can the 
difference between present and past lie, and not within two different instants of the 
actual, a past and a present. 
But why can it not be simply the sub-representational first passive synthesis of the 
living now which is responsible for this doubling of ‘now’ and ‘passing’ in experience? 
Our experience of time would then be lagging behind the contraction of the living 
now; because I have a liminal experience of the unconscious contractions out of which 
my conscious experience of now emerges, there is a fraction of time between the actual 
contractions (process), and my consciousness experiencing the present (product). Thus 
my experience would be both now and past; now as conscious representational 
experience, but this now would be past in relation to the living contractions, as already 
drawn off from the first passive synthesis of the living present. This would eliminate the 
need for a transcendental time. 
Even if this is a problem, (and precisely the one we need to unearth and dismantle 
in order to free ourselves from the prison of representation and introduce real time 
into thought - we will see how this happens in the third synthesis) we cannot rid 
ourselves from the need of a contemporaneous past by transposing the problem to lie 
between living now and represented now. This is because it is also a logical problem. 
The difference between living and represented now is a psychological difference, has 
to do with the constitution of human experience, the difference between living now 
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and pure past is a logical and metaphysical difference. The notion of present, or time – 
and therefore also any measurements on a time-scale – presuppose this difference. 6 
Thus we must distinguish between two forms of past, and their corresponding 
memory-faculty. One is the active synthesis of (empirical) memory dependent upon the 
first synthesis which remembers past presents. But before the first synthesis which 
constitutes the existing present, there must be another ‘more profound passive 
synthesis of memory’ (Deleuze 1994: 79). This is a past that is prior to the constitution of 
the present, and which therefore cannot be remembered with the empirical faculty of 
memory. This is not the past of Chronos, it is not past presents, but that which causes 
the present to pass; it is the pure a priori past which, in its contemporaneousness with 
the present, marks the difference inherent to the present as temporal becoming. It is 
here that we find the transcendental condition for time as passing. The representation 
of a former present can be reproduced and the passing of a present is reflected only on 
this ground. As the quote from Cinema 2 shows, the present is contemporary with its 
own past, but as Deleuze says many places, this past which works as a passive synthesis 
constituting the passing of time, is never itself present. This is not the time of the 
actual. This is a virtual, transcendental time. But that does not mean that the virtual 
time cannot be experienced or lived, although ’experience’ and ’lived’ must necessarily 
mean something radically different in that case.7 
This operation traces the foundation of actual perception back to a virtual 
dimension, and by way of this grounds the human faculties of sensibility and memory 
in this pre-individual element. Intuitive sensibility is founded upon the first synthesis 
that contracts moments into a present. This is matter as contraction-contemplation. 
But this is further grounded in a transcendental memory of the pure past which is that 
which causes the present to pass. This means that the corporeal present of Chronos is 
the most contracted state of this virtual pure past: 
6A lot hinges on how we understand the relation between the pure past and the living present. Joe Hughes 
(Hughes 2008: 138ff) argues that the pure past must be understood as produced by the first synthesis, and 
that the paradoxes of the contemporaneity and preexistence of the pure past only holds for the past´s 
relation to the represented empirical present as opposed to the living present. The most common interpretation 
follows Deleuze’s Bergsonian leanings here, and either sees the first synthesis as grounded and conditioned 
by the second, or sees them as mutually implicated in each other so that the pure past has a virtual reality 
which is not only secondarily produced. Related to this question is also whether Ideas are born at the end 
of a genetic line producing the faculty of thought, or if they subsist in a virtual realm. Daniela Voss has 
argued convincingly for the latter position in Conditions of Thought, see note 73, page 207. 
7Daniela Voss writes in Conditionf of Thought ‘As Deleuze contends we have the means to penetrate the 
realm of the sub-representative (DI 115/161), to explore virtual Ideas (DR 194/251), to live and to 
experience the pure past (cf. B 122/55, note 16/1) and even to create fragments of the pure past in art (cf. 
the Proustian example of the in itself of Combray (DR 85/115 and 122/160))’. 
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The present exists only as an infinitely contracted past which is constituted at the 
extreme point of the already-there. The present would not pass without this 
condition. The present would not pass if it were not the most contracted degree 
of the past. (Deleuze 1997: 130) 
What we have seen until now is a reconceptualization of Kant’s synthesis of 
apprehension and reproduction from a genetic point of view. In this analysis Deleuze 
is taking us deeper and deeper into the unconscious that constitutes empirical 
consciousness. Intuition was first grounded in a sensibility that composed and 
traversed the body, and which has the power of synthesis without any transcendental I 
as its condition. The temporality of this self-organizing intensive matter is seen to be 
grounded in a virtual temporality, the pure past. In this way Deleuze gives an account 
of the genesis of the individual out of these sub-conscious temporal processes. Because 
we are the product of this process, but unconscious of the production itself, we 
experience ourselves to be like a fixed being in relation to which time is experienced 
and conceptualized. In reality, however, we are time; ‘the only subjectivity is time, 
non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, 
not the other way round’ (Deleuze 1997: 82). The account of the passive syntheses 
makes it clear that we are internal to time. But what does it really mean to grasp non-
chronological time in its foundation? As we will see below, it is precisely this 
unconscious foundation that is ungrounded and ‘grasped’ in the transcendent exercise 
of the faculties. By reversing, splitting them apart and forcing them into a transcendent 
exercise, this genetic level of reality that constitutes the empirical faculties will be 
revealed. The third synthesis is the actual entry into this violent territory where the 
individual faces its own dissolution. Thought here becomes event, it enters and 
participates in the intensity that pulsates in and as matter, in the sensible as 
contraction-contemplation, and within this discovers access to the virtual past, that 
element in relation to which the present differs from itself, or time as becoming. 
But for this to take place the other pole in the image of thought, that of the ego, 
must also be dissolved. The represented ego, or cogito, must be dissolved because it is 
a structure of thought that fixes and ‘crucifies’ difference (Deleuze 1994: 138), and the 
cogito is therefore responsible for upholding the identity of both subject and object. It 
is this dissolution of the represented ego, which happens in the encounter, which will 
propel us into the third synthesis in which we regain the temporal syntheses as 
experience. 
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The Third Synthesis of Time 
In beginning the discussion of the third synthesis Deleuze says that ‘Temporally 
speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is 
more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito’ 
(85). For Descartes, the cogito expressed a determination (I think) and an 
undetermined existence (I am) that coincided. What the thinker is and what he does is 
one and the same: The ‘I think’ is a determination that implies existence (I am), and 
this existence is determined as a thinking existence: I think, therefore I am, and what I 
am is a thinking thing. This always renewed event of thought constitutes the self for 
Descartes. (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 24) Kant objected to this logic of implication 
between determination and existence by introducing time as the essential ‘form in 
which the undetermined is determinable’ (Deleuze 1994: 86). As a result he split the 
subject between its spontaneity and receptivity, between the determination in thinking 
and what this determination bears upon, by separating them and making that which is 
to be determined a phenomenon in time. The activity of thought determines the self 
by synthesizing a manifold in time. The result of this synthesizing determination is my 
empirical self, but the act which synthesizes can never coincide with this self. The 
time-lapse between determination and manifold content that is to be determined as 
existing means that the subject can never fully grasp itself as a spontaneous ‘whole’. In 
other words, the spontaneity does not belong to the subject but begets it, and begets it 
only insofar as what is so determined is different from what determines. The 
spontaneity of thought can only be represented by a receptive and passive self, i.e. the 
product of the process. 
This Deleuze says is a ‘furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued 
by Kant… For a brief moment we enter into that schizophrenia in principle which 
characterizes the highest power of thought’ (58). This moment is not continued by 
Kant because he reintroduced a principle of a priori identity by subjecting the process 
of thought to a transcendental I. Kant advances from Descartes by introducing time as a 
form of intuition and condition under which determination is possible and for a 
moment time enters directly into the heart of the cogito. But since experience becomes 
conditioned by the synthetic activity of a transcendental I, this time-difference is 
subjected to logical conditions of possible experience. Thus Kant opened and 
immediately closed this possibility again. But at the very moment of introducing time 
into the cogito, before folding it back into an active synthesis of the I as the condition 
for possible experience, at this moment time was not an imposition of the subject, but 
the subject was itself time. Here it is not the subject who thinks, but thought works 
directly upon the subject. 
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It is this fissure in the cogito in which the ‘I is an Other’ (Deleuze 2008: vii) which 
we must reopen. Here thinking is recognized as not belonging to the subject, thought 
is not denatured by representation, but lived as a synthesis. The schizophrenia in 
principle means that the activity of thought is experienced as belonging to an Other; in 
the third synthesis the activity of thought is brought into contact with the Outside. But 
how does this happen? 
Deleuze says that ‘on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all 
begins with sensibility’ (Deleuze 1994: 144). This beginning is to be understood in two 
ways that are two sides of the same coin. First, it means that the true point of attack is 
acquired by breaking out of the image of thought and our normal representational 
consciousness. This break cannot be generated within thought as a self-reflective and 
self-initiating capacity. This would simply reiterate the image of thought, as thinking 
would be the product of a previous cognitive process; a result, whereas this is what 
needs to be suppressed in order for thought to emerge as an original creation. 
Therefore, taking up an idea by Plato, Deleuze presents the encounter with something 
that cannot be incorporated into the cognitive system and recognized as that which is 
capable of forcing thought to awaken within thinking. This is the inverse or other side 
of the de-actualisation of recognition; the beginning of a fuse that traverses and 
induces a transcendent exercise of the faculties. Taken together it means a de-
actualisation that thereby releases forces that can lead to the creation of thinking. 
This process amounts to a suspension and reversal of the cognitive synthesis. As 
already shown, the three elements that compose the cognitive synthesis are 
apprehension, reproduction and recognition, and the outcome of this synthesizing 
process means that the faculties are mixed together on the basis of the empirically 
given: the apprehended in sensibility, the remembered past in reproduction and the 
concept in recognition converge to produce a self-identical object. This creates our 
normal consciousness of representation. Between this mental representation of the 
world and the process which brings it about there is the time-lapse discussed above 
between the living now and the represented now, and within this fraction of time is 
also to be found the threshold between unconscious genetic processes and conscious 
active cognition. Thus the genetic principles of experience are covered by the self-
conscious activity of the mind.8 But in the encounter with something that cannot be 
8‘Material repetition comes undone even as it occurs, and can be represented only by the active synthesis 
which projects its elements into a space of conservation and calculation. At the same time, however, once 
it has become an object of representation, this repetition is subordinated to the identity of the elements or 
to the resemblance of the conserved and added cases. Spiritual repetition unfolds in the being in itself of 
the past, whereas representation concerns and reaches only those presents which result from active 
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recognized, this operation is suppressed and the cognitive activity de-actualised. 
Through this de-actualisation of the empirical activity, a counter-actualisation of the 
faculties may follow in reverse order: In the encounter, our reflective determination of 
the object (recognition and the cogito) hangs in the air, unable to actualise itself as 
representation of itself and the object, and is thus suppressed. Consequently the next 
subsequent phases in the synthesis are also undone; since the reproduction is no longer 
related to identity, it can no longer contribute to the preservation of a past present, 
and therefore no conceptual determination applies. The thing encountered is no 
longer implicated and taken up into the synthetic activity of the cogito. As we have 
seen, Deleuze grounds intuition in a passive synthesis, i.e. in the contraction that 
constitutes the foundation of the living present, and the synthetic activity of this passive 
self is now no longer covered up by our active cognitive syntheses of recognition. 
Because of this we reach into the primary act of apprehension as a more or less pure 
sensation. In the encounter we become caught up in the intensity which is normally 
explicated as a quality in perception, and the force which is active but normally 
concealed is revealed. We may begin to live within the elementary excitations of our 
senses, consciousness becoming coextensive with the contractions of sensations 
themselves: 
At one and the same time I become in the sensation and something happens through 
the sensation, one through the other, one in the other. And at the limit, it is the 
same body which, being both subject and object, gives and receives the 
sensation… I experience the sensation only … by reaching the unity of the 
sensing and the sensed. (Deleuze 2005: 25) 
This quote from Francis Bacon The Logic of Sensation is a description of how the 
experience of contemplation-contraction takes place at the threshold where subject 
and object can no more be clearly distinguished. At this limit consciousness opens up 
to the life of the world, to the intensities at work in and as the sensible. But this is of 
course not a simple opening up to what is merely given. Body here does not mean the 
recognizable organic unity distinct from the rest of the world, but, insofar as the eye 
itself is contracted light, the world of light and color belongs to ‘the body’. The body is 
here the contracted pre-individual sensations spread out as light, sound, touch etc. But 
light, sound, touch and so on is of course not the representations we have of these 
qualities, but the force which lies at the basis of these sensations. At this threshold we 
merge with the microperceptions that constitute us and the well-defined world of 
subject and objects. And therefore also the organs are liberated from the organization 
synthesis, thereby subordinating all repetition, to the identity of the present present in reflection, or to the 
resemblance of the former present in reproduction.’ (Deleuze 1994: 84) 
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of the organism. The eye is not a fixed organ any more, but is liberated ‘from its 
adherence to the organism, from its character as a fixed and qualified organ: the eye 
becomes virtually the polyvalent indeterminate organ that sees the body without 
organs … as a pure presence’ (Deleuze 2005: 37). In this release of the presence 
beneath and beyond representation it is the living contraction of time itself that is 
experienced.9 The individualized consciousness confronting objects is brought into 
contact with its own coming-into-being within the orbit of the first passive synthesis 
which constitute the living now of sensations. 
Sensation is pure contemplation, for it is through contemplation that one 
contracts, contemplating oneself to the extent that one contemplates the elements 
from which one originates. Contemplation is creating, the mystery of passive 
creation, sensation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 212) 
At this point sensation apprehends that which can only be sensed, but which is 
nevertheless insensible from the point of view of ‘empirical experience’ when sensibility 
is mixed with the other faculties. Sensibility reaches into the imperceptible basis of the 
sensible and apprehends ‘not a sensible being, but the being of the sensible’ (Deleuze 
1994: 140). 
Here the first passive sub-representative synthesis is brought to consciousness and 
sensibility is raised to its transcendent exercise. We awaken to the living contractions 
from which our normal consciousness is an epiphenomenon. And that means that we 
being to live within the first passive synthesis of time, rather than building active 
cognitive syntheses upon it. We stop covering the transcendental domain with our 
image of thought. We begin to penetrate it, or rather, it begins to penetrate us. 
But this is only the beginning of the path which leads to that which is to be 
thought. This sublime experience where sensibility acts on its own is the beginning of a 
‘chain of force and fuse’ which runs through the faculties, disjoins them from common 
sense and brings each one ‘face to face with its own element’ (141). How can we 
understand this ‘fuse’ running through the faculties and unhinging them? If we take 
into account the presentation of the syntheses in the second chapter this question 
answers itself. Because we have situated ourselves within the contemplative 
contractions of the living now in sensation, we live within them instead of relating to 
their contracted qualities in represented perceptions, and because of this we have also 
moved into the core of the paradox of the first passive synthesis: the passing of the 
9‘[Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense are] an attempt to jolt, set in motion, something inside me, to 
treat writing as a flow, not a code. And I like some passages in Difference and Repetition, those on tiredness 
and contemplation, for instance, because in spite of appearances they're living experiences.’ (Deleuze 
1995: 7) 
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present. In the intensity of contractile power constituting a present, a limit-experience 
of time occurs because the present becomes dissimilar to itself. The transcendental 
time that causes the present to pass awakens. We now experience also the second 
passive synthesis within which the first takes place. The intensity in sensibility, the 
intensity in the contractile present of sensations that intuition has become in and as the 
encounter, provokes and rouses the transcendent exercise of memory so as to grasp 
that which can only be recalled: the being of the pure past. Entering the contraction of 
sensibility we also draw nearer to the forgetfulness that constitutes empirical 
consciousness. We begin to remember the immemorial, that which constitutes the 
ground of time, which is never present but which causes the present to pass. 
Transcendental memory awakens and remembers its essential relationship to the being 
of the past. In Michel Tournier and the World Without Others Deleuze describes this 
continuation from the unearthing of the first to the second synthesis as one where 
consciousness ‘has become not only a phosphorescence internal to things but a fire in 
their heads, a light over each one, and a “soaring I”. In this light, something else 
appears, an ethereal double of each thing.’ This something else, the ethereal double, is 
the virtual counterpart of the present, the pure past. This is the discovery of the world 
as image, freed from the Other-structure; ‘the new upright image in which the 
elements are released and renewed, having become celestial and forming a thousand 
capricious elemental figures’ (Deleuze 2004: 351). 
As such, because the fuse which unhinges the faculties is one continuous process, 
this is already at the same time an awakening of thought. The intensity in the sensible 
is communicated to memory, and from memory to thought, forcing thinking to grasp 
difference in itself. What is remembered in the transcendent exercise of memory is not 
similitude, not presents that were ones present, but the pure past. But this pure past is 
activated inside the intensity of the sensible, in the paradox of the passing present. 
Therefore the third synthesis is a synthesis of the previous two, but not as a 
harmonious integration, but as a disjunctive synthesis. It synthesizes the being of the 
pure past, the pre-individual virtual, and the presence of the sensible intensity that the 
perceiving body is implicated in. But sensibility as intensity is the actualization of the 
virtual. The third synthesis of the future is therefore not simply a de-territorialisation, a 
flight out of the world of actual subjects and objects, but, after the dissolution of the 
Other-structure has taken place, also the incarnation of the Outside, of a pure element 
released from the Other-structure, re-territorialised back into the perceptual situation. 
Another future is created by the metamorphosed thinker, a future which animates the 
world. As Deleuze and Guattari say in What is Philosophy?; becoming is not of history, 
but falls back into it (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 110). 
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METAMORPHOSIS: STIRB UND WERDE 
If the third synthesis of time is a metamorphosis as presented above, this means a 
simultaneous death and re-birth of consciousness. Deleuze indicates that a Stirb und 
Werde process belongs to the transformation of thinking when he writes that ‘there is an 
experience of death which corresponds to the third synthesis of time’ (Deleuze 1994: 
114). But how could death be experienced? It could only be experienced if the 
impersonal death of the third synthesis is in truth a metamorphosis in which the 
individuated consciousness dies in the face of a different kind of experience or 
consciousness. If the dissolution of the cogito as centre and identity of thought belongs 
to the beginning of an unhinging liberation of the faculties from their mutual co-
dependence, then the creation of thought consummates what was begun in the 
encounter. It is not I who encounter the intensity in the sensible, or remembers the 
immemorial being of the past, but ‘I’ am being generated in and as this event. The 
cogito is truly dissolved because it is replaced and substituted by the event of thinking: 
‘I am no longer myself but thought's aptitude for finding itself and spreading across a 
plane that passes through me at several places’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 64). Here 
a paradoxical de-individuation takes place through dissolving our already well-
constituted individuality as consciousness plunges into the pre-individual. ‘The subject 
is this free, anonymous, and nomadic singularity which traverses men as well as plants 
and animals independently of the matter of their individuation and the forms of their 
personality’ (Deleuze 2004: 123). This working of death within life in service of a 
greater life also has another name: the crack. The crack is the death instinct, the great 
instinct which condition all the other instincts of conservation and destruction, but in 
Deleuze’s rewriting of the death instinct the last to be said about this is not the wish for 
a return to inanimate matter, but an impersonal death where death turns against itself 
and transforms the instincts: ‘Is it possible since it absorbs every instinct that it could 
also enact the transmutation of the instincts, turning death against itself? Would it 
thereby not create instincts which would be evolutive rather than alcoholic, erotic, or 
financial, that is, either conserving or destroying?’ (Deleuze 2004: 369) 
 The impersonal death of the the third synthesis is therefore a metamorphosis, 
and a kind of rebirth. Genesis is here practically realized, and the immanence of this 
transcendental empiricism can be measured when Deleuze states that each faculty is 
‘borne to the extreme point of its dissolution [where] it grasps that in the world which 
concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world’ (Deleuze 1994: 143). At this point 
the eternal return is not only thought and affirmed, but effectively realized. The 
thinker lives (and dies) through a becoming, genesis is lived through.10 
10Sjoerd Van Tuinen writes that for Deleuze ‘the death drive constitutes a creative power of self-
reinvention and transfiguration. When the individual body cracks up, all sorts of nonhuman forces rise up 
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This is the point where the fulfilment of the critical project – the by now well-
known point of view of Difference and Repetition as Deleuze’s rewriting of Kant’s critique 
– as a transcendental genesis as opposed to a transcendental conditioning is 
accomplished, an accomplishment that cannot simply be theoretical but must be a 
grounding metamorphosis of the thinker. ‘To ground is to metamorphose’ (Deleuze 
1994: 154).11 And this accomplishment leads consequently into Deleuze’s vitalism, his 
ontology of life. The conscious individual life is a life begotten by an imprisonment and 
conservation of life  – ‘the organism is not life, it is what imprisons life’ (Deleuze 2005: 
33). This imprisonment is the process of individuation, and the death of the 
individuated consciousness initiates the birth of a non-organic life; a crack extended 
just enough so that the event is inscribed in the flesh (Deleuze 2004: 179-182). In 
Deleuze’s vitalism conscious psychic life is therefore a kind of death because it is 
constituted by an imprisonment, a fold which closes in upon itself, with the cogito as 
the knot on whose four branches ‘difference is crucified’ (Deleuze 1994: 138). When we 
break out of the dogmatic image of thought and liberate thinking, this sub-
representational life underlying and creating representational consciousness is released. 
The experience of death in the third synthesis of time is therefore also a birth.12 This 
metamorphosis is that experience which belongs with necessity to Deleuze’s 
transcendental genesis. Only when the non-organic life of the world is accessed can we 
think genesis from a plane of immanence. 
to its crystalline surface, such that the consistency of our immediate relations to the environment may be 
redistributed. On the fractured surface of the body without organs, a breakdown of good and common 
sense is also the breakthrough by which the thinker learns to relate to death, which, even if he “returns” 
from it with “bloodshot eyes”, is no longer his death but the neutral energy of any death whatsoever. He is 
substituted by a singular becoming that is equally his authentic being, a strange vitality at the limit: 
“imperceptible, incorporeal and ideational”. Thus life’s pathological intensities constitute both the origin 
of sense or onto-logy and the risks of a speculative life which converts organic life into a spiritual and 
critical force. Materialism does not mean the priority or anteriority of the body over thought, but the 
expressive power of the body to pass from silence to the production of sense beyond the established image 
of thought: being as voice and vital clamor.’ Van Tuinen, Sjoerd, ‘Deleuze: Speculative and Practical 
Philosphy’, forthcoming in Armen Avanessian & Suhail Malik (eds.), Genealogies of Speculation. Materialism 
and Subjectivity since Structuralism. London/New York: Bloomsbury.) 
11Christian Kerslake writes about this: ‘Maybe the central problem with the notion of immanence is that it 
cannot be a purely theoretical problem. In order to conduct a successful ‘metacritic’ – where one is able to 
produce a self-grounding movement of consciousness – one must unground oneself and enter a ‘psychic 
repetition‘ that involves encountering and accounting for one’s own singularities.’ (Kerslake 2009: 41) 
12 This reversal of life and death is consistent with Deleuze’s reference to Fichte in his last piece, Immanence; 
a Life... (Deleuze: 2002) In a footnote Deleuze refers to Fichte’s Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben for the 
concept of life. In this book Fichte speaks about the blessed life as the true life, as opposed to the 
semblance of life in which we are normally involved. Whereas our conscious life is in truth a spiritual 
death, the true life is for us death. 
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In light of this interpretation the real question for engaging with Deleuze’s oeuvre 
must be how to put philosophy into practice, how to make it work and to engender 
productive metamorphoses. For this to be created, we need find a way of engender 
thinking within thought, which means to move beyond the limits of empirical 
consciousness, to be affected by the Event, and to research it. 
 
Rudolf Steiner University College, Oslo 
torbjorn.eftestol@gmail.com 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bryant, Levi R. (2008) Difference and Givenness. Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism and the 
Ontology of Immanence, Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press 
Deleuze, Gilles (1994) Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia 
University  Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles (1995) Negotiations 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: 
Columbia  University Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles (1997) Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert 
Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles (2004) The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester, London: Continuum. 
Deleuze, Gilles (2005) Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith, 
London: Continuum. 
Deleuze, Gilles (2008) Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London: Continuum. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix (1996) What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Faulkner, Keith W. (2006) Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time, London: Peter Lang. 
Hughes, Joe (2008) Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, London: Continuum. 
Hallward, Peter (2006) Out of this World. Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, London: 
Verso. 
Kerslake, Christian (2007) Deleuze and the Unconscious. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
Kerslake, Christian (2009) Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy. From Kant to Deleuze, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Lampert, Jay (2006) Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History, London: Continuum. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 86 
Lord, Beth (2011) Kant and Spinozism. Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from Jacobi to 
 Deleuze, London: Palgrave Macmillian. 
Ramey, Joshua (2012) The Hermetic Deleuze. Philosophy and Spiritual Ordeal, Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
Somers-Hall, Henry (2007) ‘The Politics of Creation‘, Pli 18, pp. 221-236. 
Toscano, Alberto (2006) The Theatre of Production, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Van Tuinen, Sjoerd (Forthcoming) ‘Deleuze: Speculative and Practical Philosphy‘ in 
Avanessian & Malik (eds.), Genealogies of Speculation. Materialism and Subjectivity since 
Structuralism. London/New York: Bloomsbury. 
Voss, Daniela (2013) Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
 
